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Abstract
This paper works on an adaptation of the standard Pissarides model to incorpo-
rate an exponentially distributed match specic job destruction rate. We disscuss the
characterization of equilibrium, equilibrium wage, number of equilibria, stead state
unemployment, welfare and comparative statics problems in this adapted model.
1 Introduction
Pissarides model of unemployment (1990) is one of the baseline models for search theory.
Various extension has been made upon this fundamental model. In Pissarides (1990), one
basic parameter is the job destruction rate , which is the main issue this paper will focus
on.
In the basic model of Pissarides (1990), the transition between employment and un-
employment is modeled as a trading process. Workers with labor services and rms with
job vacancies want to trade. And this trading process is uncoordinated, time-consuming
and costly for both parties. Equilibrium in this system is dened by a state in which
both parties maximize their own objective functions under given matching and production
technologies, and in which the ow of workers into unemployment is equal to that of out
of unemployment.
For a worker, his problem is to maximize his present-discounted value of the expected
income ow when he is unemployed and when he is employed. In the basic model, employed
workers earn a wage w and lose their jobs and become unemployed at the exogenous rate
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, however, this uniform job destruction rate assumption is far from realistic. Di¤erent
workers may face di¤erent probability of losing their jobs. And people may only know the
distribution of their job destruction rate. In this paper, we generalize the Pissarides (1990)
model by using a randomly chosen job destruction rate i which distributing exponentially
for each worker i from a unit mass of population 1. It turns out that in the equilibrium,
expectation plays a much important role in matching decision than a single workers specic
job destruction rate i.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the assumption
and the characterization of the equilibrium of the standard Pissarides model. Section 3
presents the scenario in which for each work, match specic job destruction rate follows an
exponential distribution, and addresses the new characterization of equilibrium, equilibrium
wage, number of equilibria, stead state unemployment, welfare and comparative statics
problems. Section 4 concludes.
2 Revisit Pissarides model of unemployment (1990)
First, we introduce some basic assumptions from Pissarides(1990):
For the demography, we assume that trade and production are strictly separated from
each other. In each rm, there exists lled jobs and vacant jobs, denote mass of vacancies
as v. Similarly, a worker may be employed or unemployed, but only unemployed worker
will search for vacant jobs. Suppose there are mass 1 of workers, and unemployed ratio is
denoted as u.
For the preferences, suppose both workers and rms are risk neutral, and they share
common discount rate r. Also assume that during job search, workers enjoy some real
return b.
In this model, there are two kinds of technologies: rst we consider production tech-
nology, let each matched pair produce output worth p and rms engage in hiring at a xed
cost a per unit of time. For example, a can be imagined as the cost for job advertising.
For matching technology assumptions. Suppose a matching function which satises
mL =M(uL; vL), (2.1)
for L workers.
It is assumed that Equation (2.1) to be increasing and twice di¤erentiable in both its
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arguments, concave, and constant return to scale. Introducing notation  to denote the
ratio vu , then, by constant return to scale, we get transmission rate w at which unemployed
workers become employed as
w =
M(u; v)
u
=M(1; ), (2.2)
and transmission rate f at which vacant jobs become lled as
f =
M(u; v)
v
=
M(1; )

. (2.3)
Furthermore, for notation convenience,
m() =M(1; ) (2.4)
is used thereafter. Assume
m()  m0() > 0
then
0f () = [
m()

]0 =  m()  m
0()
2
< 0: (2.5)
We also have assumptions about information and institutions: in this model only ag-
gregate variables are known to both parties. And terms of trade determined by Ex post
bargaining. In one case, generalized Nash bargaining solution for optimal wage w is deter-
mined by
w = argmax
wi
(Vfi   Ufi)(Vwi   U)1 , (2.6)
in which Vfi denotes value to led job and Ufi denotes value to holding vacancy for
rm i 2 [0; 1], U is value to unemployment and Vwi is value to employment given wage wi
for worker i, parameter  stands for the bargaining power of rmsand  2 [0; 1].
Based on these assumptions, we consider the following questions:
First of all, for Firms: We now have one asset value equations for rms when hold-
ing vacancy and the other when job is occupied by a worker, in which i stands for job
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destruction rate:
rUfi =  a+ f (Vfi   Ufi)  Ufi , (2.7)
rVfi = p  wi   Vfi . (2.8)
At the same time, for workers: We establish asset value equation when a worker is
unemployed as
rU = b+ w(Vwi   U), (2.9)
and similarly, if a worker is holding a job with wage wi, his asset value equation is
rVwi = wi + (U   Vwi). (2.10)
From the Nash bargaining condition, since Ufi and U are exogenous options, we solve
the Nash bargaining problem by the rst order condition to get
Vfi   Ufi = [(Vfi   Ufi) + (Vwi   U)]. (2.11)
And because in equilibrium, all prot opportunities from new jobs are exploited, we
know
Ufi = 0, (2.12)
which is called free-entry condition in equilibrium.
By asset value equations for rms and workers (from (2.7) to (2.10)), wage determine
function (2.11) and free-entry condition (2.12), we have characterization of equilibrium as
m()(p  b)
[r + + (1  )m()] = a. (2.13)
3 An adaptation of Pissarides (1990) on job destruction rate
Now, keeping the other assumption unchanged, if job destruction rate is match specic and
distributed exponentially, what will happen to the unemployment model?
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Matching specic job destruction rate means that both rms and workers do not know i
they could possibly face until they are actually in the matching process(subscript i 2 [0; 1]
indexes a random worker i.). The only information about i its distribution function
F () = 1  exp( ); where  2 R++ is a parameter.
As a result, when an unemployed worker i meets a rm with a job opening, he can only
use the expectation of asset value of employment across the distribution of i to evaluate
the asset value of unemployment, then if we dene EiVwi as the expectation of ow value
of employment of worker i given wage wi across i;(2.9) is turned into:
rU = b+ w(EiVwi   U), (3.1)
By the same logic, we dene EiVfi as expectation of ow value of led job for rm
i across i, and modify asset value equation for holding vacancies (2.7) as (imposing job
destruction rate i = 0 to simplify this problem):
rUfi =  a+ f (EiVfi   Ufi), (3.2)
As for equation (2.10) and (2.8), since both of these two equations were evaluated after
the matching process when i and wi are available to both parties (wi is the corresponding
wage for i), hence, we have
rVwi = wi + i(U   Vwi); (3.3)
rVfi = p  wi   iVfi . (3.4)
Given (3.1) to (3.4), we are now able to establish a new characterization for the equi-
librium.
New equilibrium:
From free entry condition for equilibrium, consider (3.2), we know
f (EVfi) = a, (3.5)
As long as we can express EV
fi
with model parameters, the above equation can lead
to a characterization for the new equilibrium.
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Adding (3.3) and (3.4), we get
(r + i)(Vwi + Vfi ) = p+ iU; (3.6)
By calculating expectation across i; we have
Ei(Vwi + Vfi) = Ei(
p
r + i
) + UEi(
i
r + i
); (3.7)
Thus, suppose
k = Ei(
1
r + i
)
EiVwi + EiVfi = pk + U(1  rk); (3.8)
From wage determine function (2.11), we have
1  

Vfi + U = Vwi , (3.9)
If we take expectation over i for both sides of this equation, then
1  

EiVfi + U = EiVwi , (3.10)
After that, combine this equation with (3.1) and (3.8), we get
EiVfi =
(p  b)
k 1 + w(1  ) , (3.11)
and
U =
wEiVfi
1 
 + b
r
, (3.12)
Finally, the characterization of new equilibrium follow (3.5) is
a =
m()(p  b)
[k 1 +m()(1  )] , (3.13)
for
k = Ei(
1
r + i
)
If we compare this characterization with (??), which is
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a =
m()(p  b)
[r + + (1  )m()] ,
We can conclude that the main di¤erence is that in the new equilibrium, we use
[Ei(
1
r+i
)] 1 to take the place of r +  in the old one.
Equilibrium wage:
From (3.3),(3.4) and (3.9), we have the following three equations that determine the
equilibrium wage wi:
(r + i)Vwi = wi + iU , (3.14)
(r + i)Vfi = p  wi, (3.15)
1  

Vfi + U = Vwi . (3.16)
In equilibrium,
wi = rU + (1  )p. (3.17)
From equations (3.12) and (3.11), we can induce that
wi = r
wEVf
1 
 + b
r
+ (1  )p = w(p  b)(1  )
k 1 + w(1  ) + b+ (1  )p (3.18)
Thus, we nd that equilibrium wage wi is uniquely determined by model parameters,
random job destruction rate does not a¤ect wage rate at all.
Next, in order to induce unemployed worker to accept possible job o¤er, we must have
wi  b. (3.19)
Considering (3.18), this will lead to
w(p  b)(1  )
k 1 + w(1  ) + b+ (1  )p  b. (3.20)
Or equivalently,
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w(p  b)
k 1 + w(1  ) + p  b.
It is obvious that any  > 0 will satisfy this relation given a reasonable assumption
that p > b.
Uniqueness of the equilibrium:
From condition (2.5), we know
d
m()

=d < 0; (3.21)
together with
m0() > 0;
we know that the right hand side of equation (3.13) is decreasing in :
On the other side, when  ! 0; we know m() ! 0, and right hand side of (3.13)!
m()(p b)
(k 1) , which is a positive constant.
In general, as long as lim!0
m()
 is large enough, say larger than
a(k 1)
(p b) ; we can safely
conclude that right hand side of equation (3.13) is larger than a when  ! 0:
Therefore, since lim!1
m()(p b)
[k 1+m()(1 )] = 0 and lim!0
m()(p b)
[k 1+m()(1 )] > a if lim!0
m()
 >
a(k 1)
(p b) and the continuity of matching function, together with the fact that right hand side
of (3.13) is decreasing in , we know that equilibrium vacancy-unemployment ratio  exists
and unique.
Steady state unemployment:
Since people who are employed losing their job at the rate of i, i 2 [0; 1   u], while
people with mass u who are currently unemployment matching a position at the rate of
w, these two will yield a stead state condition for unemployment in this model:
1 u
s
0
idi = uw.
Since
1 u
s
0
idi = (1  u)Ei;
given each i i.i.d, we have stead state condition similar to that of Pissarides (1990)
and by the distribution of i; we know Ei = 1 :
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1  u

= uw.
or equivalently,
u =
1=
m() + 1=
=
1
m() + 1
(3.22)
Welfare:
If w is present value of all future utility, then social planner will solve
max

rw
to nd the optimal  which maximize social welfare.
In steady state, since
rw = ub+ p(1  u)  av,
and plug (3.22) in,
v = u =

m() + 1
,
we nally get
rw =
b
m() + 1
+ p(1  1
m() + 1
)  a 
m() + 1
=
b+ pm()   a
m() + 1
:
Now planners problem is
max

b+ pm()   a
m() + 1
From F.O.C
m0(^)(p  b)
m(^)  ^m0(^) + 1
= a: (3.23)
where ^ is planners choice of .
When will decentralized optimal  coincide ^? We have already know that decentral-
ized economy optimal vancancy-unemployment ratio  satises (3.13), and it is OK for
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the planner to pick r = 0 in (3.13), in that circumstances, if bargaining power of rms
 = 
m0()
m()
(3.13) coincides (3.23).
Comparative statics:
Similar to the model of Pissarides (1990),
based on (3.13), we have the following comparative statics:
If b increases, the right hand side of (3.13) falls for every value of , as a result,  will
decrease, m() will decrease, u will increase and v will decrease. Welfare will increase.
If a decreases, means  will increase, m() will increase, v will increase and u will
decrease. Welfare will increase since a is a total cost.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we adapt the stanard Pissardes (1990) model to a randomly distributed job
destruction rate. We discuss the characterization of the equilibrium and welfare from the
social planners view. we describe the stead state of unemployment and comparative statics
in equilibrium, and we prove that equilibrium is unique.
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